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Class/Race Polarisation in Venezuela
and the Electoral Success of Hugo
Cha´vez: a break with the past or the
song remains the same?
BARRY CANNON
ABSTRACT Polls have repeatedly shown a class-based polarisation around
Cha´vez, which some political science analysis on Venezuela has recognised. This
paper seeks to show, however, that this class-based division needs to be placed in
historical context to be fully understood. Examining Venezuelan history from the
colonial to the contemporary era the paper shows, unlike most previous work on
Bolivarian Venezuela, that race is an important subtext to this class-based
support, and that there is indeed a correlation between class and race within the
Venezuelan context. Furthermore, class and race are important positive elements
in Cha´vez’s discourse, in contrast to their negative use in opposition anti-
Chavismo discourse. The paper briefly reviews the Cha´vez government’s policy in
tackling the class/race fissures in Venezuelan society, and concludes by asking
whether these policies represent a change in the historical patterns of classism
and racism within Venezuelan society or are simply reproducing past patterns.
President Cha´vez of Venezuela and the movement led by him has repeatedly
triumphed at the ballot box since first being elected to the presidency in 1998.
In the presidential elections of 2000, the revocatory referendum of 2004 and
the latest presidential election in 2006, Cha´vez has maintained or increased his
percentage of the vote. But who is voting for Cha´vez in Venezuela and why?
In this article we find that Cha´vez’s support is primarily among the poorer
sections of the Venezuelan people, the popular classes, and that in Venezuela,
generally speaking, class interacts with race ‘in the production of inequal-
ities’.1 This class/race interaction in Venezuela has deep roots in the country’s
history, and the social fissures which stem from that fusion have been
repeatedly glossed over by successive governments, aiming instead to create a
myth of a united Venezuela, where class and race are elided from public
discourse.2 Cha´vez, on the other hand, in his discourse and in his
government’s policies, has repeatedly drawn attention to class differences
in the country, by attacking the privileged classes and favouring the popular
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classes—el pueblo—while also drawing attention to race issues in a number of
his pronouncements.
The class/race fusion is an essential element needed to explain Cha´vez’s
continuing popularity but most political analysis has paid little attention to
the impact of race on Venezuelan politics.3 This paper aims to redress this by
evaluating the role of race within more widely based class divisions in the
emergence of Cha´vez. Furthermore, and equally importantly, the paper seeks
to show that race, or rather racism, is an essential, but extremely subtle,
ingredient in opposition discourse rejecting Cha´vez and those who follow him.
The paper will examine these issues by first reviewing poll data on support
for Cha´vez proving the class-based nature of support for him. We will then go
on to provide a theoretical exploration of the complex relationship between
race and class, and illustrate this by examining class- and race-based prejudice in
Venezuelan history. The paper will present both quantitative data on ethnicity
and refer to studies on media content in contemporary Venezuela, to illustrate
the persistence and prevalence of racist discourse there. We will then go on to
look at the role of class and race in the discourse of both Cha´vez and the
opposition, showing how the former uses it positively to engage with the poorer,
darker skinned majority, while the opposition uses it negatively to provoke a
negative reaction to Cha´vez and his supporters, mostly among the middle and
upper classes. Furthermore, we will review positive policy measures looking to
reverse these classist and racist historical trends implemented by the Cha´vez
government and ask if this is a genuine attempt to break from this past, or
whether it is simply the reproduction of behaviour from previous governments.
In summary, it is argued in the paper that, while class remains the defining
fissure of current Venezuelan politics, race is its rarely examined subtext.
Class-based polarisation in Venezuela
Although historically class was elided from discourse in Venezuelan politics,
support for President Hugo Cha´vez is largely polarised along class lines, a fact
that has been recognised by a number of political analysts. Using poll data
from 1995 and 1998, Canache finds that it was the poor who mostly supported
Cha´vez’s failed coup in 1992 against President Carlos Andre´s Pere´z, and in a
survey in 1995 his support was strongest among the lower economic sectors.4
In the 1998 presidential elections Roberts points to strong support among
the poor for Cha´vez, whereas his chief rival Henrique Salas Ro¨mer’s appeal
was among the middle and upper sectors.5 Canache provides further evidence
of this support, showing that, in a pre-election survey conducted just before
the 1998 presidential elections, 55% of the urban poor declared their intention
to vote for Cha´vez, whereas only 45% of the non-poor expected to back him.6
Similarly in the 2000 presidential elections one poll found that 50.5% of
socioeconomic sector E intended to vote for Cha´vez as opposed to 24% for
Arias Cardenas, his principal opponent and co-conspirator in the 1992 coup,
while 66.7% of socioeconomic groups A and B intended to vote for the
latter.7 A poll published by Venezuelan polling firm Datanalisis in 2001
found a similar tendency.8
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Canache, however, predicted that the urban poor of Venezuela would
become disillusioned with Cha´vez and cited poll data to prove this at the
conclusion of her study. Nonetheless, poll data posterior to publication of
that study reinforce rather than negate the tendency of support for Cha´vez
among the poor. In a poll by Greenberg, Quinlan and Rosner in 2004, shortly
before the revocatory referendum held on President Cha´vez’s mandate, 80%
of those polled in the A/B/Cþ social category intended to vote for his
removal from office (Sı´), while close to 60% of those in the E social category
would vote against (No). Canache based her prediction on Cha´vez’s failure to
deliver promises made to the poor yet, when asked for reasons in this poll
why they chose to vote in favour of Cha´vez, 62% said they believed that
Cha´vez helped the poor and almost 60% evaluated the government’s
misiones or social programmes (see below) favourably, reinforcing the link
between Cha´vez and the lower class in popular opinion.9
More recently still, similar data was found in an Evans/Mc Donough
Company/Consultores 30.11 poll published on 29 November 2006, just over
a week before the 6 December presidential elections of that year.10 In this poll
76% of social strata A/B and 47% of stratum C said they would vote for
Manuel Rosales, Governor of Zulia province and Cha´vez’s main rival, while
64% of stratum D and 68% of stratum E intended to vote for Cha´vez. These
two strata made up the majority of respondents, representing jointly 62% of
the total. In the event Cha´vez won that election by 62%, while the turnout
was 75% of registered voters. These findings are shown in Table 1. Cha´vez’s
support among the poor has therefore remained relatively consistent over the
eight years since he was first elected in 1998.
TABLE 1. Class/race polarisation in Venezuela—poll data 2000–06
Year/social class A B C D E
% in
election
% social class in
overall pop
5 35 39 21 100
2000 66.7% (Opp) N/A N/A 50.5% (Ch) 59.76 (Ch)
37.52 (Opp)
2004 80% (Sı´)*
15% (No)*
61% (Sı´)
34%(No)
51% (Sı´)
43%(No)
38% (Sı´)
59%(No)
40.63 (Si)
59.9 (No)
2006 76% (Opp)
17% (Ch)
47% (Opp)
48% (Ch)
32% (Opp)
64% (Ch)
26% (Opp)
68% (Ch)
38.39 (Opp)
62 (Ch)
Notes: *Sı´ refers to the option in favour of removing Cha´vez; No to the option against.
Opp¼Main Opposition Candidates: Francisco Arias Cardenas (2000), Manuel Rosales (2006).
Ch¼Hugo Cha´vez Frı´as, President of Venezuela.
Sources: Author’s own elaboration, based on Carlos Subero, ‘Clases sociales tienen distinto candidato’, El
Universal (Seccı´on Nacional y Polı´tica), 6 April 2000, at http://www.eluniversal.com/2000/04/06/06102AA.
shtml, accessed 20 June 2003; Greenberg, Quinlan and Rosner, ‘Venezuela, Resultados Estudio de Opinio´n
Pu´blica Nacional: Junio 23, 2004’, at www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/uploads/encuesta-greenberg-junio-2004.ppt,
accessed 15 January 2008; Evans/McDonough Co/Consultores 30.11, ‘Clima Polı´tica Votantes Venezolanos:
Presentacio´n de resultados’, 2007, at http://www.rethinkvenezuela.com/downloads/PRESENTACION_
ENCUESTA_NACIONAL_NOVIEMBRE_2007.pdf, accessed 15 January 2008; and Consejo Nacional
Electoral, Resultados Electorales [online], at http://www.cne.gov.ve, accessed 13 November 2007.
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Cha´vez’s rise therefore signifies ‘a repoliticisation of social inequality in
Venezuela’ with mostly the popular sectors identifying with Cha´vez and the
middle and upper sectors with opponents of the president.11 The main
argument in this paper, however, is that there is a racial subtext to this
support. On the one hand, the poor’s support for Cha´vez is based on the fact
that he is like them: from a poor background and pardo (of mixed
Indigenous, African and European descent). The figures presented in Tables 2
and 3 below would seem to support this suggestion. Conversely, the rejection
of Cha´vez by parts of the middle and most of the upper classes in Venezuela
is precisely a rejection of these very qualities: being poor and dark-skinned.
This rejection is furthermore based on a deeply rooted historical rejection of
the Black as being culturally and socially inferior to the White. Despite, as
Wright points out, the ‘seamier sides of racism’ being eradicated during the
pre-Cha´vez period (1958–93),12 the so-called puntofijo era,13 this association
of the Black with backwardness remains strong in Venezuela, especially in
terms of media depictions of the poor. Dark skin, as we shall see, is still
associated with poverty and, the darker the skin, the more likely that that
person will belong to the poorer sections of society. Thus race and class
remain associated in Venezuela, despite advancements in eradicating some
elements of racism.
In order to prove this, let us first examine the substantive point of this
article, that class divisions in Venezuelan politics have an element of ethnic
and race division within them, before going on to examine more closely the
association of race and class in Cha´vez’s discourse and policy, as well as
looking at classist and racist elements in opposition anti-Cha´vez discourse.
Race/class interaction
Despite views to the contrary, racism still exists and operates in Venezuela
and this racism has deep roots in the country’s colonial past. Furthermore, in
Venezuela as in much of the rest of Latin America, concepts of race and class
fuse, whereby generally speaking it is believed that the darker a person’s skin,
the poorer that person will be.
Before looking at the concepts of race and class in the context of
Venezuelan history, we first of all need to look at the relationship between
these two concepts in sociological theory to provide a theoretical background
to this contextual discussion.
Miles and Brown see the concept of ‘race’ and ‘races’ as ‘socially imagined
rather than biological realities’. In a nutshell they see the phenomenon of race
and racism as diverse but one that always centres on an ideology based on
what they call a Self/Other dialectic. This ideology is twofold, they argue.
Following Taguieff the act of racialisation of a given population, attributes
that Other with negative attributes (‘autoracialisation’), while simultaneously
and automatically giving the Self positive attributes. Hence, for example,
European colonial discourse on Africans portrayed them as ‘less civilised, a
barbarian, by virtue of supposedly looking more like a beast and behaving in
ways that approximated to the behaviour of a beast’.14 Conversely, the Self,
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the European was seen as being the epitome of civilisation and human
development. Such a conceptualisation, Miles and Brown argue, seeks ‘to
claim the authority of a natural (and therefore unalterable) difference
[and] . . . is the prelude to exclusionary practices’.15
So what is the relationship, then, between the concept of race and that of
class? The two are interlinked they argue because both perpetuate inequality.
‘Racism is a denial of humanity (substituting, as it does, ‘races’ for ‘the
human race’) and a means of legitimating inequality (particularly inequality
explicit in class structures).’16 How they interact, however, will depend on the
class position of those practising racism, because ‘Erlebnis (lived experienced
of the world) and its consequent problems vary with class position’.17 Indeed,
the forms and expressions of racism have had ‘varying interaction with
economic and political relations in capitalist and non-capitalist social
formations’,18 hence any discussion of racism must therefore be ‘historically
specific [as it is] knowable only as a result of historical analysis rather than
abstract thinking’.19 Consequently discussion on racism in Venezuela and its
relationship to class must be looked at in an historical context to be properly
understood, which is our task in the next few sections.
Colonial and early republican contexts
During the colonial era Venezuela had small indigenous populations relative
to the richer colonies of Peru and Mexico, so consequently it had to import
labour through slavery from Africa, at considerable cost, both human and
economic. In the period from the Conquest up until 1797, when the African
slave trade ended, 100 000 Africans entered Venezuela.20 These slaves were
harshly treated both physically and socially and the black and the indigenous
would remain stigmatised within Venezuelan society from thence on.
Venezuela nonetheless became one of the more racially mixed colonies of
Spanish America, as a process of miscegenation began there from the earliest
times of the colony. By the end of the colonial era 60% of Venezuelans had
African origins and, of the 25% classified as white, probably some 90% had
some African ancestry.21 This would have repercussions for the country’s
view of itself in later years, and of its inhabitants of themselves, as we
shall see.
Gott sees this era in Latin America in terms of a ‘white settler’ society
paradigm. Seeking to ‘eliminate the indigenous population’, either physically
or through policies of assimilation,22 white settlers in Latin America set out
to achieve this by ‘simultaneously oppressing two different groups within
their territory: they seized the land of the indigenous peoples, and they
appropriated the labour of the black slaves that they had imported’.23
Republican Venezuela retained or assumed the characteristics of coloni-
alism, resulting in the Latin American white settler elite having a Eurocentric
approach to society and nation building, and a deep mistrust of native and
African conceptions of community and society.24 In consequence the white
settler elites of Latin America had more in common with the elites of Europe
and North America than with their fellow Latin Americans, leading to an
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‘ingrained racist fear and hatred of the white settlers, alarmed by the
continuing presence of the expropriated underclass’.25 Struggles between rich
and poor in Latin America were therefore not only class-based but also race-
based, a fact, Gott notes, that ‘even politicians and historians of the Left’
have ignored, preferring to ‘discuss class rather than race’.26 Venezuela was
no exception within this pattern, although it has had distinct overtones
because of its individual historical trajectory, as we shall see.
Miscegenation in modern Venezuela
This rejection of the black and the indigenous continued into the 20th
century through the ‘ideology of mestizaje (miscegenation), also known as the
myth of democracy or racial equality, [which] served to mask racial
discrimination and the socioeconomic situation of the Afro-Venezuelan
and indigenous communities’.27 In this ideology the white European was
identified as ‘the civilizing agent, making Africans and the indigenous and
their descendants largely invisible’.28 This ideology also ‘denied the existence
of social classes’, and instead looked to a cultural homogenisation, spread
primarily through the educational system.29 This policy of mestizaje and the
denial of racism within Venezuela continued into the liberal democratic
puntofijo regime, installed definitively in 1958.
The puntofijo regime was designed to avoid conflict and antagonism, to
encourage conciliation and to negate the polarisation of Venezuelan society
along class and, following the logic of our argument, racial lines. Access to
the vote, to education and to health services, and an expanding middle class,
temporarily ameliorated the worst excesses of class/race divisions in
Venezuela, forging even further the myth of a classless, non-racist, united
Venezuela. Yet, as time went by, the economic model began to be exhausted
under the weight of a slump in oil prices and increased external borrowing.
From Black Friday in February 1983, when the government of Luis
Herrera Campins dramatically devalued the bolı´var in the face of a slump in
oil prices and massive capital flight, the regime began to crumble. On the
economic level, for example, Venezuelans saw their standard of living
plummet. Between 1990 and 1997, according to the UN, per capita income
fell from US$5192 to $2858, and Venezuela’s human development index from
0.8210 to 0.7046.30
With this economic crisis the vision of a united, non-racial and classless
Venezuela lost its mythical power. Racist discourse began to re-emerge
among the upper and middle classes. The link between class and race became
more explicit as Afro-Venezuelan and indigenous people became the
scapegoats for Venezuela’s economic failure. Ishibashi shows how stereo-
types of the fecklessness and indolence of Afro-Venezuelans were perpe-
tuated through the Venezuelan media. As Ishibashi puts it: ‘The ‘‘white’’ is
normally the symbol of the beautiful, the rich, the pure and the sophisticated,
while the ‘black’ is the symbol of the ugly, the poor, the impure and the non-
sophisticated’.31 Black people in the Venezuelan media, in advertisements, TV
soaps, cinema and in beauty pageants, are practically ‘invisible’. When they
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are seen, they are often associated with partying on the beach, reinforcing the
idea of the black as being ‘feckless’, or in a position of providing a service of
physical labour.
Class plays a role in the depiction of blacks in the Venezuelan media, with
products directed at the upper classes usually being advertised by white
models, while those directed at the popular classes usually use darker skinned
models. As one media photographer admits: ‘the darker the [skin] colour, the
more [models] are associated with the lowest social classes’.32 Indeed, not
only is ‘colour associated with [social] classes’ but Afro-Venezuelans are also,
as we have seen, associated with the ‘ugly’.33 This reinforces the association
in the popular mind of the ‘West’ or the ‘white’ being associated with the
‘superior and civilised’ while the rest are ‘inferior and savage’.
It is of no surprise then that in surveys done on ethnicity within Venezuela,
those who identify themselves as ‘Afro-Venezuelan’ are in a small minority,
of much less significance than those who identify themselves as white. For
example, in the 2007 World Values Survey in Venezuela, 4.2% of respondents
identified themselves as Black–Other/Black, whereas 35.8% identified
themselves as White/Caucasian White. Nevertheless, the survey also provides
a number of intermediate options, such as ‘Coloured-Dark’ (16.6%) and
‘Coloured-Light’ (42.7%). Indigenous groups, on the other hand, represent
only 0.5% of the population but, despite their small numbers, have important
symbolic value.34
Apart from the highly subjective nature of such categories (what is the
actual physical difference between Black and ‘Coloured-Dark’?), not to
mention the high probability that those who identify themselves as
‘Caucasian-White’ have some element of Black or Indian blood (as noted
by Ewell35), the important point to note is that the majority of Venezuelans,
roughly 64%, identify themselves as non-white. It is important also to point
out that, in a social context where the Black is highly undervalued, if not
despised, the probability of Venezuelans not identifying themselves with that
ethnic category is doubtless increased.
While at the time of writing it appears that no figures exist providing a
breakdown of the racial make-up of each social class in Venezuela, it is
instructive to compare social class breakdown with that of racial categories.
As we can see in Tables 2 and 3, if we compare the total of social sectors
AþBþC, at 40%, with the total of those who identified themselves as White,
at 35.8%, we find a strong similarity in the percentages found pertaining to
both these categories. Similarly, if we compare the total of sectors DþE, the
poorest social sectors, at 60%, with the total of those who identified as non-
white (ie black, coloured dark, coloured light and indigenous) at 64.2%,
again we find a high level of correlation between both sets of figures. This
suggests, although by no means definitively, that there is a strong level of
probability that those who identify as white are found in the higher social
sectors, while those who identify as black, mixed raced or indigenous are
found in the D or E social categories. If we then go on to look at the figures in
Table 1 above, showing voting patterns in favour of President Cha´vez, we
find similar correlations between percentages in all three sets of figures. In
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other words, there is a high probability, judging by these figures, that a
poorer Venezuelan, with darker skin, will vote for Cha´vez).
These figures suggest furthermore that, as Herrera Salas emphasises,
racism is not just a social phenomenon in Venezuela but has a political
economy rationale also.36 This is reinforced by the dependent situation of
Venezuela’s economy. Structured employment, wealth, taxation and the
distribution of social goods in Venezuela are subject to influence by the
structural factors of race/class and economic relations with the core capitalist
countries. Economic dependence preserves underdevelopment, perpetuating
the existing class/race bifurcation and the inequalities stemming from these
basic societal cleavages, which in turn itself further perpetuates economic
dependence.
Both these factors have resulted in a stratified society based on race, with
non-white majorities having limited access to the scant formal employment
opportunities available. The white or ‘near-white’ elite, on the other hand,
acts as the mediator between local markets and capitalist centres, with local
capitalists playing a reduced role in the local market, providing basic
consumer goods (such as beer, wine, flour etc) to it but few high-value
manufactured products.
These economic and cultural tendencies led the country to a deepening
political polarisation which, as we shall see in the next section, became most
apparent during the second presidency of Carlos Andre´s Pere´z (1989–93) as
he attempted to introduce a neoliberal restructuring programme into
Venezuela.
TABLE 2. Venezuelan social class sectors, population breakdown
Social class AþB C D E Total
% social class in overall pop 5 35 39 21 100%
Total AþBþC and DþE (%) 40 60 100
Note: (A, B, Cþ). Social strata vary from poll to poll but generally those in A, B and upper C are regarded
as in high-income brackets; C- in the middle income bracket and D and E in the low income bracket, the
poorest income stratum.
Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on Greenberg, Quinlan and Rosner, ‘Venezuela, Resultados
Estudio de Opinio´n Pu´blica Nacional: Junio 23, 2004’, p 24, at www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/uploads/encuesta-
greenberg-junio-2004.ppt, accessed 15 January 2008.
TABLE 3. Racial category breakdown for Venezuela
Racial category White Coloured (light) Coloured (dark) Black Indigenous Total
% race in overall pop 35.8 42.7 16.6 4.2 0.5 100
Totals (white/non-white, %) 35.8 64.2 100
Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on World Values Survey, ‘Online Data Analysis, Venezuela—
1996, 2000: Sociodemographics—Ethnic Description’, at http://www.jdsurvey.net/bdasepjds/wvsevs/home.
jsp?OWNER¼WVS, accessed 15 January 2008.
Categories were self-selected by respondents from presented options.
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The rise of neoliberalism and the death of a united Venezuela
The introduction of neoliberal policies by Pere´z sparked off the greatest
public disorders seen in modern Venezuelan history, which came to be known
as the Caracazo (27–28 February 1989). Pere´z brought in a number of IMF-
sponsored economic measures, including the raising of fuel costs with a
concomitant rise in public transport charges. This provoked residents of
Caracas’s overcrowded shantytowns, and those in many other Venezuelan
cities, to come down from the cerros (hills) and proceed to loot shops and
warehouses, initially for food, but, as the disturbances developed, for all sorts
of consumer goods. Government reaction was initially tame but eventually
President Pe´rez called a state of emergency and left it to the army and police
to quell the disturbances. The result was the use of ‘massive violence’ and an
official death toll of 277, an unofficial one running into the thousands.37
Establishment presentations of the Caracazo unearthed once again the
barely latent classism and racism buried under the official myth of a classless
and non-racial Venezuela. To those in power the Caracazo represented the
eruption of barbarism, of primitivism pitted against civilisation. The pueblo
(people) were a source of barbarism, the government and the elite a force for
reason and civilisation; ‘the nation was split in two’.38 After the Caracazo
Venezuela would not be the same again, as protest became the norm,
increasing both in incidence, violence and variety and extending to almost all
sectors of society.39 It symbolised the eruption of the class factor once again
into the national political arena and, following the logic of our argument,
also the question of race.
Despite President Pere´z admitting the class nature of the disturbances and
accepting that it was the economic measures which sparked them off,40 he
persisted in their implementation, leading initially to some macroeconomic
success. By 1992, however, unemployment, informalisation of employment
and poverty had all increased.41 Meanwhile, as the Venezuelan population in
general and the popular classes in particular paid the price of economic
reform, the governmental and business elites were seen to be enriching
themselves even further through financial speculation and/or corruption.
Dissatisfaction grew and in 1992 Pere´z’s government was rocked by two
unsuccessful coups, the first led by Lt Col Hugo Cha´vez on 4 February.
While the coups failed, by 1993 Pere´z was impeached and under house arrest
for corruption, finally going into exile, where he still remains.
This cleared the way for the emergence of Cha´vez as a political force in the
country and, as we have seen in the first part of this paper, his support came
mostly from the poor of Venezuela. Yet, as we have sought to prove, the vast
majority of these poor are the darker skinned, black or pardo citizens of
Venezuela. The next section will seek to answer the following question
therefore: why do the poorer, darker skinned majorities of Venezuela vote for
Cha´vez? Two reasons are offered for this: first, Cha´vez has exalted the nobility
of the ordinary Venezuelan in his discourse, and emphasised that the ordinary
Venezuelan is poor and of mixed-race extraction, like himself. Second, the
Cha´vez government has directed policy towards improving the social and
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economic situation of the poor, pardo Venezuelan. This contrasts greatly with
opposition discourse and policy which has subtle, and sometimes not so subtle,
racist and classist elements causing distrust among most poor Venezuelans.
Cha´vez’s discourse on class and race
The ‘people’: race and class in chavismo
The movement launched by Cha´vez adopted as its ideology a system of
thinking specifically Venezuelan and Latin American, bolivarianismo, rather
than one based on imported ideologies. Bolivarianismo is based on the
thinking and teachings of three major figures from Venezuelan history:
Ezequiel Zamora, popular military leader in the Federal Wars; Sı´mon
Rodrı´guez, educator, friend and mentor to the final member of the trinity, the
Liberator, Sı´mon Bolı´var. Each figure provides a specific element to the new
ideology: Zamora the element of rebellion, popular protest and protagonism,
summed up in the slogan attributed to him: ‘Land and free men! Popular
elections! Horror to the oligarchy!’; Rodrı´guez the requirement for
autochthonous ideological originality when he warned that ‘either we invent
or we commit errors . . . America should not servilely imitate, but be original’;
and Bolı´var, the Liberator, the symbol of equilibrium between the dualism of
rebellion and ideology, force and consent.42
Central and crucial to this ideology is the concept of el pueblo, the people.
It is of interest here to have a diversion into the theoretical meaning of the
concept of the people, as developed by Ernesto Laclau in his theories on
populism. For Laclau, the people are not so much a coalition of identities, as
portrayed by many analysts of populism, but rather invest their diverse
identities into one privileged identity. He illustrates this with the distinction
between the people as populus, the body of all citizens, and as plebs, the
underprivileged. The ‘people’ of populism comes about when the plebs
represent the populus—‘that is, a partiality which wants to function as the
totality of the community’.43
Central to this process of construction of the ‘people’ is the role of the
leader. Populist leaders are often drawn by analysts as strong, charismatic
and paternalistic macho men, with an autocratic, authoritarian bent. They
are seen as ‘outsiders’ and are portrayed as manipulative of the ‘people’,
autocratic, power hungry and ambitious. Laclau, however, resists attributing
the prominence of the leader in populist movements to these characteristics.
Populism for him is a chain of demands whose unity is expressed through one
element of those demands (in this case the plebs). In other words, the totality
is expressed through a singularity and the extreme form of a singularity is an
individuality. The group, the totality of the populus, becomes symbolically
unified around an individuality, in this case the leader. The ‘leader’ therefore
‘is inherent in the formation of a people’.44 Panizza clarifies this position
further. For him, the leader is ‘an enigma that promises meaning: the promise
of a fully reconciled people’.45 The leader therefore comes to signify the
people themselves, or rather what the people strive for.
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This process can be seen in the relationship between Cha´vez and the ‘people’
in Venezuela. Cha´vez reifies the people in his discourse. For him, ‘popular
protagonism [is] the fuel of history’ and only when this protagonism exists is a
people truly el pueblo.46 The Venezuelan people specifically are a true people, a
people who have shown, and are capable once again of greatness:
we are one of the liberating peoples of the world, we are a people of creators, of
poets, of fighters, of warriors, of workers, there’s history to prove it, let’s
honour it, let’s honour the spirit of our aborigines, of our liberators, of our
women, of our youth . . . all of that we have in our veins and in the clay from
which we were made, let us show it, it is the moment to show it.47
Leadership is vital to achieve the necessary protagonism lying dormant in the
people, so that the people become a people actively struggling. Cha´vez rejects
the notion of the caudillo, the leader/masses model put forward by many of
his critics. Leadership must be provided in order to galvanise the collective
into action, but the leader is but a conduit. The people are an ‘unleashed force,
equal to the rivers’ being channelled by leaders such as Cha´vez because either
‘we provide a course for that force, or that force will pass over us’.48 Cha´vez is
‘not a cause, but a consequence’,49 ‘an instrument of the collective’.50
Race and class are central sources of identification with the concept of
el pueblo for Cha´vez. Cha´vez repeatedly emphasises his background as a
pardo and as a common man. Kozloff quotes Cha´vez as saying: ‘My Indian
roots are from my father’s side . . . He [my father] is mixed Indian and black,
which makes me very proud.’ He also boasted, according to Kozloff, that his
grandmother was a Pume´ Indian. Kozloff goes on to report that, apart from
being pardo, ‘Cha´vez was [also] born in extremely humbling conditions in the
llano [Orinoco plains area of Central Venezuela]: ‘‘I was a farm kid from the
plains of South Venezuela,’’ he remarked to Ted Koppel on ABC’s Nightline.
‘‘I grew up in a palm tree house with an earthen floor,’’ he added’.51 Cha´vez
frequently refers to cultural symbols associated with grassroots Venezuelan
communities: the arepa, a corn bread that is part of the staple diet for
ordinary Venezuelans, baseball, the national sport, and he occasionally
breaks out into a typical Venezuelan song in the middle of a speech, which is
often laden with colloquialisms.
On another occasion Cha´vez pointed out the links between racism in the
USA and the underlying racism in discourse against Cha´vez himself:
Racism is very characteristic of imperialism. Racism is very characteristic of
capitalism . . .Hate against me has a lot to do with racism. Because of my big
mouth, because of my curly hair. And I’m so proud to have this mouth and this
hair, because it is African.
In the end, Cha´vez insists it is socialism, ‘a new ethic’, which is needed ‘to
beat those ominous phenomen[a] such as racism’.52
Through discourse celebrating the common man and his ethnic back-
ground, Cha´vez is underlining his similarities with the majority of
Venezuelans. As we have seen, most Venezuelans are black or mixed race,
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with some indigenous (64%) and most are in the lower socioeconomic
brackets (62% in strata D and E). It is probably no accident therefore that in
the last presidential elections in 2006, similar percentages of the population
voted for Cha´vez (62% out of a turnout of 75%).
Opposition discourse on class and race
The Cha´vez discourse celebrating race and class contrasts greatly with that
emanating from opposition elements. Some of this discourse presents deeply
subtle forms of racism and classism, whereas some of it is much more overt.
In it the image is projected of a pueblo being easily manipulated and
incapable of thinking rationally. Pedro Carmona Estanga, for example,
leader of peak business organisation, Fedecamaras and erstwhile president
for 48 hours during the coup against Cha´vez in April 2002, wrote in an article
published shortly before the 1998 presidential elections that ‘people don’t
understand the Constituyente but simply emotionally follow the candidate
that is promoting it’. Francia gives further examples of this, where the vote
for Cha´vez is considered an ‘emotional’ vote, while votes against him are
considered ‘rational’.53 Similarly Julio Borges, leader of US-funded political
party Primero Justicia (Justice First), qualifies those who vote for Cha´vez as
‘inhabitants’ not ‘citizens’, implying that they acted without thinking.54 On
field work to Venezuela in 2002 I found that some people rejected Cha´vez
because, according to them, Venezuela needed ‘gente preparada’, educated,
trained people, this despite the fact that Cha´vez has a BSc in military science
and studied for a Masters in Political Science.
Less subtle forms of racism and classism are also found in opposition
discourse on Cha´vez supporters. In March 2004, during a high-level
international summit in Caracas, opposition television station Globovisio´n
parodied President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe as a monkey, prompting
six African countries to object.55 Herrera Salas points to a visceral racism
and classism directed towards the president and his supporters by opposition
members and media, where the president is routinely referred to as ‘Indian,
monkey and thick-lipped’ or simply as a ‘monkey’.56 Supporters of Cha´vez
are regularly referred to as ‘hordes’ and the pro-government Bolivarian
Circles as ‘terror circles’. Duno examines how media portrayals of Cha´vez
supporters suggest this image of the mob as one ‘swayed by its leader, or
moved by base emotions, failing to exercise its will in a rational fashion’.
Worse, the image is of ‘those people [who] go on marches because they
are paid to or because it gives them a chance to get drunk’.57 These portrayals
of Cha´vez supporters have underlying them a profound racial and classist
bias.
Duno shows us by recounting several examples of media racism against
Cha´vez supporters that it is indeed the construction of a ‘national political
imaginary. . .articulated on the basis of racist thought’.58 In the end the main
thrust of these disqualifying media presentations of Cha´vez supporters, Duno
asserts, are ‘a strategy to remove political legitimacy from marginalised social
subjects’59 who are in effect political actors who have challenged power.60
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Furthermore, as Wilpert asserts, this is a strategy on the part of the old
established elite, removed from power by Cha´vez, to attempt to regain that
power. The old elite uses ‘its control of the country’s mass media to turn the
middle class against Cha´vez, creating a campaign that took advantage of the
latent racism and classism in Venezuelan culture’.61
Some opposition analysts, while recognising this racism and classism
within the opposition ranks, blame Cha´vez for this situation. For Patricia
Marquez of the elite Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administracio´n
(IESA), for example, it is Cha´vez who has ‘stirred up the beehive of social
harmony’.62 Yet, Herrera Salas counters, it ‘is evident. . .that [Cha´vez’s]
political discourse and the symbolic and cultural practices of the Bolivarian
Revolution have emphasised so-called national values, significantly reducing
the occurrence of ethnic shame and endoracism in the popular sectors’.63 This
chavista discourse has been translated into numerous policy initiatives which
have further recognised the existence of the class and race fractures in
Venezuelan society, as we shall see in the next section.
Bolivarian race and class policy
In general indigenous and Afro-Venezuelans, as well as the majority pardo
population, can take advantage of the various missions set up by the Cha´vez
government to ensure greater access for the popular classes in a variety of
social areas. Indigenous groups also have their own, specific misiones. Mujica
and Rinco´n group these into the following areas: 1) education; 2) health; 3)
food and salaries; 4) employment; 5) land; 6) indigenous and 7) identity.64
Under ‘education’ there is a number of missions: Missions Robinson I
covering basic literacy and II covering the completion of primary education.
Mission Ribas covers secondary education and Sucre third level, both of
these providing monthly scholarships of $100 for each student.
Under ‘health’ there is the most important Mission ‘Into the Neighbour-
hood’ (Barrio Adentro) which establishes health clinics in shanty towns
covered by Cuban medical personnel. There are also the Miracle Mission
(Mision Milagro) providing eye operations for children in Cuban hospitals
and Sports Mission (Mision Deporte) promoting sport in marginalised areas.
Under food and salaries there is Mercal Mission, which provides low-cost
food stuffs through a state-run store network, as well as the Maximum
Protection Programme providing half-price basic food stuffs and comedores
populares or Soup Kitchens providing low-cost meals.
In employment, Mission Turn Heads (Mision Vuelvan Caras) builds on the
work of the educational missions by helping their graduates find work, while
Piar Mission helps mining communities. On land, Mission Zamora,
associated with the Land Law, works on land distribution to poor families
as well as providing credit, technical assistance, training and infrastructure.
Mission Guaicapuro promotes the integral development of indigenous
communities, ensuring that their constitutional rights are delivered. Finally,
the Housing Mission seeks to guarantee the right to housing and the Identity
Mission to ensure that everyone obtains legal identity documents.
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In general it is estimated that, of the $40.5 billion dollar 2006 budget, 41%
was dedicated to social programmes and that social spending has increased
threefold since Cha´vez came to office in 1998.65 Much of that social spending
went on the various misiones explained above.
The Cha´vez government has also attempted to tackle disadvantage based
on race, for the indigenous at least. Indigenous people are guaranteed
through Article 121 of the Bolivarian Constitution the right to maintain their
cultural identity, the state’s promotion of that right, and the right to
education in a culturally appropriate manner. There are reserved seats in the
National Assembly for indigenous people and some indigenous have
occupied high-level posts, such as Noelı´ Pocaterra, who became vice-
president of the National Assembly. The Organic Law for Indigenous
Peoples and Communities (LOPCI in its Spanish acronym), passed in 2006, set
up the National Institute of Indigenous Peoples (INPI) run by the indigenous
and charged with establishing the procedures for the demarcation of
Indigenous Lands and Habitats. Other laws passed include the creation of
a Vice Ministry for Indigenous Affairs, new health care initiatives and the
extension of the Mision Guaicapuro in education.
There is, however, no corresponding recognition of Afro-Venezuelans in
the Constitution and, as a result, no pro-Afro-Venezuelan legislation, despite
representations from Afro-Venezuelan groups. In a package of proposed
amendments to the Constitution formulated in August 2007, however, such
recognition was finally proposed. This package was rejected by the
Venezuelan people in a referendum in December of that year, largely
because of controversial proposals to extend presidential powers.
Nonetheless, we can see from this brief summary that Cha´vez himself has
prioritised class and race issues in discourse and many policy initiatives have
tackled classism directly, with race issues being subsumed within these more
general programmes, except in the case of the indigenous. The question
remains, however, to what extent this represents a genuine change in the
structure of Venezuelan society. We turn to this question in the next section.
Class and race in Venezuela: a break with the past or the
song remains the same?
Despite the advances outlined above there are several problems in their
design and delivery, as well as resulting from the historical context, which
have limited the impact of change for the popular classes, in their majority
pardo, Afro-Venezuelan and indigenous peoples of Venezuela.
Of all the initiatives aimed at eliminating disadvantage along class lines,
the Missions have been most successful. The combined effect of the Missions
and other social programmes has resulted in a drop in poverty from 44% of
households in 1998 to 31% in 2006. This, as Weisbrot et al point out, only
covers cash income66—the combined effects of the abovementioned missions,
most of which are not cash-based, may have further reduced poverty in
Venezuela. For example, the Venezuelan government has provided free
health care to an estimated 54% of the population and subsidised food for
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40%.67 Furthermore, the management of these missions provides much
popular participation, through a variety of novel mechanisms such as
local health committees (comite´s de salud) or local communal councils
(consejos comunales) to develop and manage local affairs at neighbourhood
level.
In its annual evaluation of human rights for 2004–5 the independent
Venezuelan human rights organisation, PROVEA, hails the advances towards
social justice and equality during Cha´vez’s years in power. These improve-
ments have been particularly felt, they note, among the poorest sections of
society, with an important increase in income for socioeconomic stratum E,
the group, as we have seen, which provides the bedrock of popular support
for the Cha´vez government. PROVEA sees these tendencies as a democratising
force, increasing equality and social justice.68
In the following year’s report (2005–06) it recommends, however,
improvements in five key areas in order to ensure lasting structural changes
in favour of all, but particularly the traditionally excluded.69 These are:
1. Integrating Missions into the existing institutionality and putting them
under more rigorous cost and evaluation controls.
2. Creating a real division of powers between institutions, reducing the
protagonism of the presidency, and reversing the tendency towards the
militarisation of Venezuelan society.
3. Fostering an appropriate climate to handle conflict and reach consensus
through the creation of more space for dialogue.
4. Providing a National Plan for Human Rights with ample popular
participation.
5. Ensuring the participation of the population in public affairs,
guaranteeing citizenship and the autonomy of social organisations.
‘Who governs in the next six years’ PROVEA concludes, ‘have the challenge to
construct a democracy with social justice, solid and efficient institutions, less
poor people, with citizens more conscious of their rights, and with a
significant decline in human rights abuses and impunity, as well as creating
adequate conditions for the exercising and enjoyment of all human rights
without discrimination’.70
While the Cha´vez government has advanced notably towards a number of
these goals since coming to power in 1999, and while discursively in
particular it has clearly voiced its wish to aim towards many of them, in
practice it still has quite some way to go. The most recent 2006–07 PROVEA
survey notes that Venezuela is in a state of transition between the old
puntofijo republic and a new form of state aiming towards a ‘socialism of the
XXI century’. Within Venezuelan society there is a battle, within and without
the government, between those whose actions are characterised by
authoritarianism and those aiming towards a full participative democracy.71
It remains to be seen if, in the remaining five years of Cha´vez’s second full
mandate, he will aim towards the latter with the necessary vigour to ensure
popular participation for all, especially those traditionally excluded on the
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basis of class and race, and thus truly reverse the historical patterns which
helped create the space for him to emerge as a leader in the first place.
Conclusion
To conclude, our survey shows that the bulk of Cha´vez’s support emerges
from the poorer, darker skinned sectors of Venezuelan society. This has two
implications: first, that there is a polarisation around class in Venezuela, with
a powerful racial subtext which points to the emergence of a class-based
political system for the present at least. Second, in terms of the study of
Venezuelan politics and Cha´vez’s support in particular, that there is a
complex interrelation between class and race in this area. However, this has
only been a tentative exploration to highlight this fact and, if anything, the
issue needs more detailed research to draw out its full implications.
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